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EGYPTIAN LAND LAW: AN EVALUATION
by David F. Forte
Egypt was not unique when, in 1949, it undertook to introduce a
modern, Western-style Civil Code into a traditional society. Both Islamic and non-Islamic underdeveloped nations have sought to lay a basis
for participation in modern economic and commercial activities by
adopting a Western civil code. Indeed, even larger states such as the
Soviet Union and China (before the rise of Mao Tse-tung) followed the
same route.
In all cases, the country adopting the Western code has attempted
to infuse it with traditional values or with tenets of a particular ideology. Frequently, the inevitable dichotomy between the basic concepts of
the code and the values which have been infused into it produce legal
tensions. This has certainly been the case in Egypt. Traditionally, Egypt
has had difficulty accommodating a growing population on a limited
amount of arable land. Whether Egypt is able to remedy past maldistribution of arable land will have significant social, economic and
political consequences. The success of legal reform in Egypt must be
judged by the standard which led to the adoption of the Egyptian Civil
Code in the first place: has the Code significantly reformed and simplified the law governing the ownership of land?
Based on limited evidence, it seems fair to say that the Code has
had but limited success in reforming land law. Indeed in some ways, the
introduction of the Code has been counterproductive. This has occurred
because Egyptian land law continues to be subject to several countervailing influences.
To begin with, the Code has supplanted significant portions of
traditional Islamic land law, as outlined in the Shari'a. Judges are
instructed by the Code to apply principles of Muslim law only if code
provisions or customs do not provide a basis for deciding a case (Art. 1).
The placing of custom before the Sharia is a serious violation of the
scheme of authority in traditional Islamic law. Although some of the
Code's provisions relating to estates in land were derived from Islamic
law, a reading of the Code makes it clear that such provisions are
merely exceptions to the general rules derived from the French Code
Civil.
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This has placed devotees of the SharTa in a dilemma. Many Muslims maintain that if a modern code must be adopted, it must be done
without any reference to the Sharia, lest the divinity of Islamic legal
norms be cast into doubt. These Muslim legal experts prefer to leave the
Shari'a uncompromised as a source of law. To them, the incorporation
of certain Islamic principles into a modern legal code in no way
"legitimizes" such a code. To the contrary, they consider that the inclusion of Islamic principles in a code causes the SharTa to be made
dependent and secondary.
The traditional legal norms are defended because they are considered to be of divine origin. Consequently, the authoritativeness of
the Civil Code is constantly being challenged. Calls for a return to
fundamental Islamic principles are an inescapable part of Egyptian
life.' The inclusion in a draft of a new penal code of a provision making
apostasy a capital offense is a recent example. In addition, fundamentalist Muslims pose a political challenge to the government, for they
seek to displace the legal authority on which the government is based.
One of the movements which the Sadat government combats most
fiercely is a fundamentalist movement which seeks a return to a society
based upon "pure" Islamic values. Violence and repression are the
2
hallmarks of the battle between this group and the government.
Even if the Civil Code were accepted as authoritative by the Egyptian populace, problems would arise in its application. This is because
many of the land law provisions of the Code are archaic. The Code's
land law provisions were derived from like provisions of the French
Civil Code, which in turn were based on Roman Law and traditional
French practice extant at the end of the 18th century. For example, the
provision that a sale is not finalized until it is registered, but that once
it has been registered all rights then accrue from the moment of sale
(Art. 934),3 has led to much controversy. It causes many more disputes
than would a simpler transfer law.
The final and most persuasive cause of the Code's lack of success in
reforming land law is the destabilizing influence of the state. Throughout Egyptian history, the state has sought to exercise significant control
over the ownership and use of land. From the earliest days of Islam,
property was distinguished according to its tax status vis-A-vis the
state. Under the Mamluks, lands were seized by the state, and then
leased under a lease which gave the lessee what was tantamount to a
freehold interest. Similarly, in the 19th century, Mohammed Ali appro1. Even Anwar Sadat publicly acknowledged this sentiment by stating, "Egypt
should return to the main principles of our Muslim heritage." Critchfield, Egypt's
Fellahin 1, Northeast Africa Series, July 1976.
2. 1976 Arab Report and Record 688; Sunday Times (London), 1 June 1975 at 1.
3. For the French version, see 1 Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, Pt. 2, No.
2615 (12th ed. 1969).
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priated most land to the state's use, and then returned it to private
hands. Consequently, no matter how stable land holding relationships
may be-whether under traditional Islamic law or a "modern" codethe possibility of state intervention in land ownership, for whatever
political or ideological motives may move those in power, is ever
present.
These three impediments to the successful operation of a modern
civil code-traditional Islamic influences, archaic code provisions, and
state interventionism-have plagued Egyptian law land throughout the
Nasser and Sadat administrations. The unpredictability of state action
has been the most persistent problem.
Scarcely three years after the promulgation of the Code, the Nasser
regime, in pursuit of its policy of Arab socialism, began imposing
restrictions on the ownership of land. The Land Reform Law of 1952
limited to 200 feddans the amount of land which an individual could
own. Under that law, any land owned in excess of 200 feddans was
taken by the state, paid for with long-term bonds, and distributed (in
lots of from two to five feddans) to the fellahin, landless peasants.4 In
1961, the maximum amount of land which an individual could own was
reduced to 100 feddans. In 1963, land owned by foreigners was expropriated. Finally, in 1969, the maximum land holding was again reduced,
5
this time to 50 feddans.
As the land ownership ceiling was reduced, compensation for expropriated land diminished. In 1953, land holdings of the royal family
and of officials of the monarchy were taken without compensation.
Private holdings were also expropriated without compensation for a
period. In 1964, the government cancelled all interest payments due on
bonds given in exchange for expropriated lands, and declared that the
6
bonds themselves were not redeemable.
During the 1960's, arbitrary executive action taken for political
motives became commonplace. At one time, Nasser ordered that confiscated lands be given to the veterans of the disastrous Yemeni war, an
action which paralleled early Islamic practice. Simultaneously, he ordered the sequestration of the properties of political opponents. Under
sequestration, the bare title of the property remains with the owner,
while the state acquires the rights of alienation and use of the property,
as well as the right to income derived from it. Thus, sequestration does
not require compensation.7 There were two periods during which se4. Gadalla, Land Reform in Relation to Social Development Egypt 38-39
(1962).
5. Mabro, The Egyptian Economy 1952-72 at 63-64 (1972); Ministry of Agrarian
Reform and Land Reclamation, Agrarian Reform and Land Reclamation 1952-63
at 29 (1963).
6. Mabro, supra n. 5 at 64.
7. In the 19th century, sequestration was used as a penalty for non-payment of
taxes. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt 31 (1963).
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questration was common: one was after the dissolution of the confederation with Syria, and the other was after the disastrous Seven-Day War
with Israel in 1967. In all, approximately 15,000 persons had property
sequestered during those two periods.8
No civil code can be considered as a legitimate and predictable
source of law in the face of such executive capriciousness. In 1969,
Nasser turned against the judiciary. In his fear of political competition,
fostered by Egypt's defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967, he believed
that the courts harbored enemies to his regime. Although Egyptian law
provided for removal of judges only by judicial procedure, Nasser reorganized the judiciary so that 100 judges were unseated. 9
Almost immediately upon taking power, President Sadat evinced a
desire to establish predictable legal procedure as part of a design to
encourage economic development. He reinstated the judges whom Nasser had removed from office. He promised profit repatriation and
guaranteed both foreign and domestic investors that their properties
would not be expropriated. Attracting back domestic capital which was
invested abroad during the Nasser years has proven to be a difficult
task. 10 Following an order issued-but never executed-by Nasser,
Sadat restored the properties confiscated from 19 former officials of the
monarchy.1 Sadat has also given $10 million in compensation to
Americans whose holdings were confiscated by Nasser in 1961.
Early attempts to rectify the excesses of sequestration were stymied for a while. In late 1970, Sadat decreed the return of sequestered
lands, and in April of 1972 a Parliamentary committee recommended
the payment of compensation to persons whose lands had been sequestered. However, nothing was done to effectuate the policy of rectifying
the excesses of sequestration until 1974, when the Council of State,
Egypt's highest court, declared Nasser's sequestration decrees illegal
and ordered the return of sequestered properties. 12 Following the decision of the Council of State, two methods of settlement were put into
effect. Under one method, an arbitrary ceiling on financial settlements-$50,000 per individual and $100,000 per family-was imposed.
Compensation for about 20% of all sequestered lands has been awarded
under this method. Under the other method, full property rights can be
returned to the bare owner, but the owner has to dispose of all property
in excess of the 50 feddan (100 feddan per family) limit within one year
after restoration of his property rights. Four hundred property owners
have temporarily regained 10,000 feddans in this fashion. It is not clear
8. 1974 Arab Report and Record 79.
9. 1971 Arab Report and Record 563.
10. 1976 Arab Report and Record 476; 1975 Arab Report and Record 334; 1974
Arab Report and Record 169.
11. 1975 Arab Report and Record 306.
12. Apparently, the high value of the lands-reportedly worth $10 billion-had

caused Sadat to forestall making settlements.
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how much land remains subject to a right of settlement, for the traditional inefficiency of Egyptian bureaucracy has slowed the processing
of claims. 13
While attempting to undo the excesses of the Nasser regime, Sadat
has not abandoned the policy of land reform fostered by his predecessor. The limitation of ownership of land to 50 feddans per individual
remains. New lands are distributed to the fellahin, while ambitious
plans for major reclamation projects have been announced. 4 Nevertheless, the success of the land reform policy is seriously threatened by
natural impediments, a soaring birth rate, and legal chicanery. Higher
water tables caused by the Aswan Dam have reduced agricultural
production on lands surrounding the dam. The government recently
admitted that the land reclamation programs had caused more losses in
production than gains. Egypt's population of forty million is growing
by 3% per year.' 5
Differentiation in landholding classes is once again occurring. Successful farmers are circumventing the limitation on land ownership:
relatives are made titular owners of land to keep ownership within the
letter of the law. These new entrepreneurs hire many peasants as day
laborers and pay bribes to government officials to guarantee official
"ignorance" of de facto violations of the law. In addition, money len6
ders are acquiring more land by foreclosing mortgages on farms.'
At the other end of the spectrum, many smaller holdings are being
reduced to tiny plots. Although statute forbids the division of holdings
of less than five feddans, many fellahin follow the traditional Islamic
law of inheritance and divide their small farms among their children. 7
Also, many small farmers forced to join government cooperatives have
to engage in a form of sharecropping, which effectively reduces the size
of their holdings in many instances.
. There is pressure on the Sadat government to initiate further land
reforms. Foreigners are still not allowed to own property worth more
than 1,000 Egyptian pounds. This limitation has angered Arabs of other
nationalities who have sought to purchase real property-particularly
in urban areas-through Egyptian agents.' 8 There has long been agitation for an increase in maximum allowable landholdings. The government has "leaked" rumors that it will raise the maximum limit.
Egypt remains in severe economic straits. The government's efforts
to encourage foreign and domestic investment have not yet achieved
significant results. Much of the Sadat government's failure to build
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

1974 Arab Report and Record 169.
1975 Arab Report and Record 461, 584; 1976 Arab Report and Record 410.
Rubenstein, "Egypt Since the October War," 70 CurrentHist. 14 (1976).
Critchfield, supra n. 1 at 12-14.
Gadalla, supra n. 4 at 64-65.
The Times (London), 27 August 1976 at 1.
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confidence among investors is attributable to what is perceived to be a
precarious hold on power by Sadat himself. Egypt's problems with
Israel-and recently, with Libya-its demographic problems, and its
archaic bureaucracy all contribute to its economic malady. However,
even discounting these impediments, Egypt's attempt to modernize
through the enactment of a Western-style civil code has not met with
success. Traditional Islamic values, certain out-of-date code provisions,
and the unpredictability of state action continue to vitiate the effectiveness of the Code.

